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Uncertainty is a basic condition of medicine - in research, in the clinic and in the inter-
section between the two domains. Prognostics is in its very nature an attempt to address 
and manage the uncertainty of the future. New technologies are continuously developed 
in order to make prognostics more precise and hence make the future more predictable. 
However, such technologies may not always serve to decrease uncertainty, but rather en-
hance or introduce new uncertainties, and thereby open other futures than those imagined. 
Our study follows an interdisciplinary Danish research group currently seeking to advance 
methods of neuroimaging in prognostics for unresponsive patients with uncertain cons-
ciousness due to anoxic brain injury after an out-of-hospital cardiac arrest. Applying an 
interdisciplinary approach combining ethnographic methods and philosophical analysis we 
trace the experience of uncertainty in this context of tool development at the intersection of 
scientific and clinical reasoning around disorders of consciousness. Specifically, we employ 
and develop the three-dimensional framework of uncertainty developed by Han, Klein and 
Arora (2011). We identify salient uncertainties from the perspective of the researchers and 
show how these lead to different uncertainties experienced by the clinicians. Additionally, 
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we show that while ambiguity may be the source of different kinds of uncertainty, the con-
text determines the nature of the source. Our investigation has a descriptive and theoretical 
focus, however, uncovering these details may serve as a basis for normative discussions of 
strategies for uncertainty management, as well as evidence evaluation in research and the 
clinic in the future. 
Introduction 
»He [the physician] is noticeably moved by the fact that it was possible to locate something 
after all, a response. He says that he had a hunch all along that she [the patient] reacted 
to sound. As an example, he mentions that one day, when he had been in to see her, had 
stirred a teaspoon in a cup by her head and then the patient had moved her eyes as if to see 
where the sound came from. Peter [MR-physicist and researcher] repeats that he cannot 
say anything about whether the response indicates life, consciousness or anything to which 
hope may be attached, but the normal MR-scan is completely unchanged and she is clearly 
anoxic.« (Fieldnotes from report to clinician following fMRI scan of patient with 
anoxic brain injury clinically diagnosed as vegetative).
Most people who have survived an out-of-hospital cardiac arrest (OHCA) are ini-
tially comatose. While some may gain capacity of functional communication to 
different degrees, others never recover. The prognosis for recovery is radically dif-
ferent depending on whether the patient develops to a vegetative state (VS)¹ or a 
minimally conscious state (MCS) (Giacino et al. 2018). Patients in VS are regarded 
as lacking the capacity for consciousness entirely, while patients in MCS are con-
sidered to have some minimal capacity for consciousness. Currently the standard 
method for determining consciousness is the JFK Coma Recovery Scale–Revised 
(CRS-R) (Giacino, Kalmar, and Whyte 2004). CRS-R relies on behavioral cues and is 
ordered by degree of complexity from the purely reflexive to behaviors mediated 
by cognition. It is comprised of six subscales: auditory, visual, motor, oromotor 
and verbal functions, communication and level of arousal (Giacino, Kalmar and 
Whyte 2004). Researchers have argued that this method is conceptually flawed, as 
it equates behavior with consciousness, and that the rate of misdiagnosis and the 
related problem of prognosis is unacceptable (Overgaard 2009). Misdiagnosis of 
VS has received a lot of attention, both in the public and in medical research. Case 
descriptions of sudden awakening and discovery of consciousness after years of 
misdiagnosis trail through medical and critical care literature (Vanhaudenhuyse 
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et al. 2018; Bruno et al. 2011). This has led to a wish for new tools of diagnostics 
and thereby more accurate prognostics for this subgroup of patients. The hope 
for such new tools in the future is that more precise assessments of the level of 
consciousness may enhance predictions of who may potentially benefit from bet-
ter treatments (i.e. Stender et al. 2014; Skibsted et al. 2018). Thereby, also providing 
better support for decisions on withdrawal of treatment. 
To the individual a prognosis concerns the possible futures of a life. A progno-
sis is a prediction of an outcome conditional on the characteristics of the patient 
and a considered medical action (Hilden and Habbema 1987). Prognostication in 
unresponsive OHCA patients is highly complex, as information from several cli-
nical and epidemiological studies, as well as observations of the individual patient 
and considerations about plasticity of the brain must be integrated in a single out-
come. Prognosis often has the form of a probability of an outcome within a time-
frame (Hilden and Habbema 1987). Thus, the prognosis is itself an expression of 
uncertainty. The prognostic tool serves as a technology for making the prognosis. 
Developing a new prognostic tool is an attempt to reduce uncertainty, making it 
possible to outline discrete scenarios that provide more coherent support for the 
necessary decisions in individual cases (Hilden and Habbema 1987). 
Our ongoing study follows the work of a research group behind a current ex-
perimental protocol at a Danish hospital, working to implement fMRI scans and 
EEG measurements in the diagnostics and prognostics of OHCA patients with 
ambiguous consciousness. We explore the experience, negotiation and manage-
ment of uncertainty specifically in relation to the introduction of the new neuroi-
maging tools. In this paper, we focus on the fMRI tools, as this part of the protocol 
is more advanced in terms of integrating the research in the clinic. 
Our aim is to explore the uncertainties involved, as well as take an important 
step towards developing our interdisciplinary research methodology. The study 
is novel, as it traces uncertainties by simultaneously working from empirical ma-
terial produced in the ethnographic field and from an abstract theoretical fra-
mework towards a characterization of the salient uncertainties. Others have tried 
to outline the sources of uncertainty in disorders of consciousness (DOC) from a 
philosophical perspective (Lazaridis and Johnson 2018). However, our analysis is 
novel as it integrates empirical material and offers a structured framework for the 
uncertainty. We employ and critically discuss a three-dimensional conceptual fra-
mework for characterizing uncertainty in medicine developed by Han, Klein and 
Arora (2011), designed to encompass all (possible) manifestations of uncertainty in 
health care. We outline their framework and critically discuss its application to the 
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case of the development of the neuroscientific tools, as prognostic tools of the fu-
ture in assessing disorders of consciousness. Employing this framework provides 
a possibility to distinguish different kinds of uncertainties and aspects of uncer-
tainties. It thus makes it possible to describe the detailed landscape of uncertainty. 
Our investigation has a descriptive focus, however uncovering these details may 
serve as a basis for discussions of normative and ethical considerations, in relation 
to selecting strategies for management of uncertainties, as well as in an evaluation 
of evidence in research and the clinic in the future. 
Methods and Ethnographic Setting
The study employs a blend of methods from analytic philosophy and medical 
anthropology seeking to harvest the potential of theoretical reasoning situated in 
a specific ethnographic context. Utilizing the theoretical tool of conceptual analy-
sis from analytic philosophy we seek to clarify key concepts and explore the logi-
cal space of uncertainties in relation to the setting. The comprehensive ethnogra-
phic material of the study is a combination of interviews, participant observation 
and relevant documents. Specifically, we include material from six semi-struc-
tured interviews with researchers and clinicians engaged in the development of 
the experimental protocol. Further, fieldnotes are included from ongoing partici-
pant observation in a highly specialized intensive care, early neuro-rehabilitation 
hospital setting (since May 2019). As well as participant observation in a related 
research context, specifically concerned with the experimental fMRI, including 
fieldwork in two experimental fMRI scans (September 2017) and the clinical in-
teraction around these. Also, email correspondence in relation to fMRI scans, as 
well as relevant documents related to the experimental protocol, such as informa-
tion for participants and surrogates about the fMRI scan, clinical guidelines and 
descriptions of treatment trajectories constitutes part of the material. The field in 
this study is as such multi-sited, encompassing a constant movement between the 
clinic and research settings, and the transfer of knowledge constituted between 
these. The analytical work in this study is framed abductively (Timmermans and 
Tavory 2012; Brinkmann 2014) as a movement between the theoretical model of 
uncertainty (Han et. al 2011) and the empirical hesitations and uncertainties in-
troduced to this model from the ethnographic work. Research always involves 
an ethical relation with the world we are studying (Hastrup 2004), which directs 
the representations and authority claimed by our work. This project holds ap-
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parent ethical challenges, as the research is carried out in very sensitive settings. 
Approaches to ethics and informed consent has been thoroughly discussed with 
participants and gatekeepers to the ethnographic settings. Specifically, all parti-
cipants in interviews have provided written, informed consent and for the parti-
cipant observation the management at the hospital and clinic have consented to 
the work. All staff, relatives and others we have interacted with in the field have 
been informed of the work and asked permission for our presence in the specific 
situations. Patients were informed about our presence in field but were not able 
to respond to this information. The study is registered with Aarhus University, 
Denmark and the Central Denmark Research Ethics Committee has been notified 
of the project (Case number: 1-10-72-1-19). In accordance with Danish research re-
gulations they do not require ethical approval for this research.
The Three-Dimensional Framework
Han, Klein and Arora (2011) define uncertainty as an experience of ignorance and 
argue that each particular experience of uncertainty in medicine is characterized 
by three dimensions. The first dimension is the source of the uncertainty – the 
primary cause of the uncertainty. The second dimension is the issue – what the 
uncertainty is about. The third dimension is the locus of the experience – the 
subject who experience the uncertainty. Below we outline their framework and di-
scuss how it applies in our field. During the outline we provide relevant examples, 
however as each instance of uncertainty is characterized by all three dimensions 
the initial exposition will focus on the conceptual boundaries of the framework. 
In our exposition we develop the framework, where things have been left unclear 
by Han and colleagues (2011 and 2017). For an overview of dimensions se also 
Figure 1.
Sources 
The source of uncertainty is that which causes the specific uncertainty. Han, 
Klein and Arora (2011) distinguish between three main sources 1. Probability 2. 
Ambiguity and 3. Complexity. Below we explain each category.
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Probability 
Concerns the fundamental indeterminacy or stochastic nature of future outcomes. 
This is what Hacking (2006) has termed aleatory probability. For example, we may 
know from a study that 50 % of subjects who are initially diagnosed as being 
in a MCS has no to moderate disabilities after 12 months (Giacino and Kalmar 
1997). However, with respect to the individual patient in the clinic we have no 
knowledge of which outcome will result. What we do know, is the probabilities 
of these outcomes. This is similar to knowing the probabilities in a game of heads 
and tails with a fair coin. Uncertainties stemming from probability are sometimes 
labeled ‘irreducible’ as they cannot be reduced by the mere acquisition of more 
knowledge. 
Ambiguity 
This source of uncertainty concerns the nature of available information about 
probabilities. Examples are lack of reliability, credibility and adequacy of infor-
mation. This is also called epistemic uncertainty, as it relates to the knowledge, or 
lack of such, about the probability of nature (Djulbegovic, Hozo, and Greenland 
2011). Ambiguity can arise as the result of imprecisions, conflicting or insufficient 
evidence. One way of managing this in science is by stating a confidence interval, 
which reflects the reliability of the statistical estimate. 
Complexity 
Han, Klein and Arora (2011) characterizes complexity as “aspects of the phen-
omenon that make it difficult to comprehend” (p. 833). In this way complexity 
is defined by both ontological and epistemological aspects, as it depends on the 
character of the phenomenon as well as ability to comprehend. Examples pro-
vided are conditional probabilities or multiplicity in causal factors, outcomes or 
choice options, which may diminish comprehensibility and/or produce informa-
tion overload. As complexity has an epistemological aspect it may be remedied to 
some extent, for example it may be managed through the use of algorithmic tools 
in prognostics. 
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Issues
The issues of uncertainties concern what the person is uncertain about. Han, Klein 
and Arora (2011) divide issues into three main categories: 1. Scientific uncertainty. 2. 
Practical uncertainty 3. Personal uncertainty. Each focus on specific parts of the me-
dical situation. Scientific uncertainty is disease-centered, whereas practical uncer-
tainty is centered around the medical system and finally personal uncertainty is 
centered around the patient.
Scientific Uncertainty
Scientific uncertainty concerns uncertainties about scientific entities and activities 
such as models, measurements and sampling. Han, Klein and Arora (2011) distin-
guish between four issues: diagnosis, prognosis, causal explanations of the illness 
and treatment recommendations. Our focus is prognosis. However, in practice 
these issues are highly entangled and we take diagnosis to be an important step 
in the process of prognosis (Wilkinson 2013). Depending on the locus the issues of 
prognosis may take different forms. A clinician may be uncertain about the pro-
gnosis of an individual patient, whereas a researcher may focus on uncertainties 
about the capacities of the prognostic tool. 
Depending on the sources, the scientific uncertainties may also be of different 
nature. From probability we encounter uncertainties tied to applying class pro-
bability (the frequency) to individual case probability. In theory, this may not be 
remedied by more information. However, in practice what can be done to aid such 
a generalizations, is to have high awareness of differences between patients in 
the test group, as well as the setting under which the result was obtained (Djul-
begovic, Hozo, and Greenland 2011). When the source is ambiguity, we may di-
stinguish between conceptual and methodological uncertainty (Han et al. 2017). Con-
ceptual uncertainty may have two main sources namely model inadequacy (in our 
setting this could relate to general models of consciousness or models relating 
cognitive abilities to brain activation) and taxonomical inadequacy: limitations 
presented by the taxonomical system used to classify the illness i.e. the definitions 
of categories. Methodological ambiguity concerns uncertainty about test or research 
methods such as: 1. Problems with the integrity of sample or data (i.e. bias) 2. 
Limitations of test methods (i.e. precision and accuracy in instruments) 3. Unmea-
sured factors 4. Error or variance in the procedure 5. Misinterpretations of test (i.e. 
failure to analyze test results).                              
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In prognostics, complexity is also regularly a source of uncertainty as the pro-
cess of prognosis involves taking into account information about how different 
causal models interact, as well as the results of tests and clinical studies.
Practical Uncertainty
Concerns experience of lack of knowledge of structures of the health care system, 
such as facilities, resources and expected quality of care, as well as processes for 
actions in this system. The examples included by Han, Klein and Arora (2011) 
are exclusively focused on the patient and relates to uncertainties about the com-
petence of one’s physician, how to identify and access the right services, the re-
sponsibilities and procedures that one must undertake to receive care. However, 
practical uncertainty understood as uncertainty regarding which practical actions 
to perform and how to navigate the health care system are also part of the world 
of the clinicians and researchers. A clinician may face uncertainties related to pa-
tient care (i.e. where in the system does this patient get the best possible treatment 
or which unit can I discharge the patient to?). Similarly, researchers may experi-
ence uncertainties in relation to the development of the new prognostic tool (i.e. 
How do we recruit enough patients for the trials?).
Personal Uncertainty
Personal uncertainty, according to Han, Klein and Arora (2011), concerns psycho-
social and existential issues such as the effect of treatment or illness on one’s goals 
in life and one’s personal relationships. They particularly mention issues identi-
fied by Kasper et al. (2008) such as social integration and uncertainties about ma-
stering of requirements. The categorization by issue does not in itself determine 
the locus of uncertainty, however, the only appropriate locus of the examples of 
personal uncertainty mentioned in Han, Klein and Arora (2011) is the patient. 
Locus
Establishing the locus of uncertainty always requires reference to a specific situa-
tion or given circumstance. In a specific situation uncertainty can exist in several 
loci at the same time or be manifested exclusively in one of the subjects partaking 
in the situation. According to Han et. al. (2017) uncertainty may sometimes be 
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shared, as when a physician effectively educates the patient about scientific uncer-
tainties relating to the benefits and harms of a treatment. However, if we are to 
take at face value Han et al.’s definition of uncertainty as a subjective experience, 
then uncertainty is difficult to truly share, as one dimension will differ, namely 
the locus. That is, the uncertainty experienced by the physician and the patient are 
not two different instances of the same uncertainty, but rather two kinds of uncer-
tainty. What is shared is the issue and the source of the uncertainty. This is a more 
precise characterization as it highlights that the locus of the experience makes 
a fundamental difference to the nature of the uncertainty. Uncertainties sharing 
both source and issue may differ greatly in salience and related feeling of urgency 
depending on the locus. After all the patient will be the one suffering both harms 
and benefits of the treatment in question. Further, different people are likely, due 
to different cognitive capacities and extent of knowledge, to experience different 
degrees of uncertainty, even when the source and issue are shared. We may also 
expect that uncertainties may be experienced differently depending on wider so-
cial and socio-economic context (Løvschal-Nielsen, Andersen, and Meinert 2018). 
It is exactly because the context of the individual person matters that it makes 
sense to include locus as a separate dimension in the framework. In the case of 
unresponsive OCHA patients, a key question is exactly whether the individual 
patient may be the locus for uncertainty at all. However, as our focus here is the 
process of the development of the new prognostic tools, we focus exclusively on 
the loci of the clinical and research staff. 
Tracing Uncertainty in the OCHA Case
In this section, we employ the three-dimensional framework in tracing and ca-
tegorizing uncertainties in the case of the development of a new neuroscientific 
prognostic tool for nonresponsive OCHA patients, while at the same time using 
examples from the empirical investigation to elucidate how the conceptual fra-
mework could be developed. Working from the three-dimensional framework 
there are several possible ways to begin to trace the uncertainties as each dimen-
sion provides a possible point of departure. In this paper, we take point of depar-
ture in the loci of researchers and clinicians and then consider salient uncertain-
ties experienced in each locus in turn. However, before outlining the uncertainties 
we briefly introduce the technology and methods behind the fMRI protocol.
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Introduction to the Technology and the Aim of the Protocol
The fMRI method measures activity by measuring blood circulation in the brain 
and the difference in magnetic properties of oxygenated and non-oxygenated 
blood. The stimuli in the test of the experimental protocol are auditory and the 
tasks are passive and require no action on part of the participant. Patients are te-
sted twice during the 8-10 weeks period of assessment. The results of the fMRI are 
presented as images where the average of several measurements is projected onto 
a model of the standard brain. In the protocol, the technology is envisioned as a 
means for assessment of the individual patient: »the recorded images are employed 
for detection and assessment of the level of consciousness of the patients«. It is a stated 
ambition of the protocol to share the results of the individual tests with the sur-
rogates of the patient participant. This is also outlined in the information material 
provided to surrogates prior to study enrolment: »Your relative will be able to directly 
benefit from the examination (test), as the results will be included in the overall assessment 
of the prognosis and the future process of treatment«.   
The Researcher’s Perspective 
Scientific (Methodological) Uncertainties 
Some of the scientific uncertainties related to the new tools are disclosed in the 
procedure of the fMRI scans. Even patients assumed to be in VS have involuntary 
spasms, head movement, or irregular breathing. At one of the first scans, the very 
disruptive and irregular breathing pattern of the patient, causing sudden bursts 
of movement, created some methodological uncertainties with respect to the pos-
sibility of using the data for analysis.
»The images look like crap”, the researcher says, “even the most creative analysis 
won’t tell if that was a response, or he just moved« (fieldnotes, August 30, 2017)  
The source of this uncertainty was ambiguity about the quality of the data. The 
patient in the scanner was relatively still compared to what may in general be 
expected which made the researchers worry that they would have to give up the 
study altogether. As a way of controlling this uncertainty, the researchers subse-
quently introduced a light sedative drug into the protocol. However, this drug re-
duces the activity in the brain area of interest for the test. The activity of this area 
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is, according to research, already reduced in this type of patients, so the sedation 
adds uncertainties on its own. Also, this second uncertainty arises from the am-
biguity involved in the possibility of measurement error. These uncertainties are 
particularly salient for the researchers as it is their responsibility to try to remedy 
these by further modifications of the method. In the end, the researchers, despite 
the poor quality of the data, were indeed able to locate a response in this parti-
cular patient. As the patient was considered vegetative by clinical observations 
this was a surprising result. Though the researchers considered the result to be 
certain, the clinician chose in the end not to include the finding in the prognosis. 
We will return to this issue when considering the uncertainties experienced by 
the clinician.
Uncertainties Surrounding the Stimuli and Paradigm
It was the original intention that the fMRI part of the protocol should share the 
experimental paradigm of the already ongoing EEG study. This paradigm was 
quite complex and developed to track a hierarchy of different levels of language 
processing from »automatic sound processing to the tentative language processing and 
to the full-on difference in meanings« (Interview with researcher). It was designed as 
an oddball paradigm. This kind of paradigm consists of a sequence of the same 
repetitive stimuli (the standard) which is randomly interrupted by a different sti-
mulus (the deviant). However, in the process of testing the paradigm in the fMRI 
scanner with a healthy control, the researchers identified some salient methodo-
logical uncertainties with respect to the stimuli and its interaction with people 
in the scanner. People in the fMRI scanner are lying down and the noise is quite 
high. This means that even for healthy subjects the person is more likely to fall 
asleep than in the EEG study where people are seated in a chair. Also, the fMRI 
researcher indicated that it had been a concern to them that the OCHA patients, 
who they would be examining in the scanner, were likely to fluctuate in and out 
of consciousness. Given the state of the patients, it was of concern whether they 
were able to get through to the person at all and they were less concerned about 
more complex cognitive functions. Even the structure of the oddball paradigm 
was considered to be too complex for the purpose: 
»[…]there were some studies about how one could mix these [the stimuli], […] then 
there was something about, that we should run two times instrumental and then 
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three times with lyrics and so on…but again, it got too… as long as we could see any-
thing at all.« (Interview, MR-physicist/ researcher on design of the stimuli). 
Thus, a simpler or less nuanced paradigm seemed not only sufficient but also 
more appropriate. By chance, the fMRI researchers happened to discuss this while 
being overheard by another neuroscience researcher not engaged in the particular 
project. This person suggested to them to use the difference between instrumental 
music and music with lyrics for the paradigm, based on the success of another 
research group with such studies. Satisfied with this suggestion the researchers 
opted to develop a new paradigm including musical stimuli which could be play-
ed »at full blast« and which could be heard by the participant in the scanner. The 
selected music was a well-known, popular song supposedly familiar to most fu-
ture patients. The stimuli were made out of two 15 sec cut-outs of this song, one 
instrumental and one with lyrics. The two music cut-outs were played in sequence 
with a 15 pause after each and followed the same rhythm through all 15 minutes 
of the scan. The paradigm was not tested on healthy subjects previous to the fMRI 
scans involving patients. 
 It is possible to interpret the situation in at least two ways. One is to see this as 
a lack of respect for the normal standard of such research, that stimuli should be 
tested on healthy subjects first. A recent national clinical guideline from the UK 
warns of uncertainties related to the standard of the experimental paradigms for 
neuroscientific research in relation to disorders of consciousness (Turner-Stokes 
and Royal College of Physicians 2013). Similar concerns were raised in interviews 
about this project on the appropriateness of developing stimuli in this way. On 
the other hand, the choices made by the fMRI researchers can be interpreted as 
a weighing of uncertainties in light of real-life conditions revealed only in the 
clinical setting. In this light, the situation can be described in the following way: 
Everything is set up for the experiment, ethics have been approved, the scanner 
has been updated, and so on, but the paradigm seems at risk of making people 
fall asleep in the scanner. It also appears unnecessarily complex to the researcher 
and something needs to be done. There are three options. The first is to stop the 
research, the second is to go ahead with the paradigm anyway and the third is 
to make something new. There was no time to conduct initial (statistically sig-
nificant) research on healthy subjects. This is a matter of weighing uncertainties. 
There are uncertainties tied to the original stimuli which seem very salient to 
the fMRI researcher and which is not something that would have come up as a 
problem in the original EEG study on healthy subjects. In the EEG study all parti-
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cipants were awake and sitting up. Furthermore, the EEG study took place in the 
quiet research facilities at the university. Not in the messy clinical setting. There 
is also a less visible but equally relevant uncertainty in using the EEG paradigm, 
which is that even this particular stimuli and paradigm has not been tested on he-
althy subjects in the fMRI-scanner (apart from one pilot scan at the hospital). That 
is, there is no statistical evidence of activation patterns as measured by an fMRI 
scan for this particular paradigm. Transferring a paradigm and stimuli from one 
imaging modality to another is not straight forward and introduces uncertainty 
(Warbrick, Reske, and Shah 2013). This uncertainty has to be weighed up against 
the uncertainties of developing an entirely new paradigm with new stimuli.  
It is remarkable to observe that the salient scientific uncertainties for the re-
searchers are methodological uncertainties linked to the implementation of the 
method and acquisition of data. In contrast, conceptual uncertainties, which have 
been central to the philosophical debate, such as inadequacy in models of consci-
ousness and how brain activity relates to levels of consciousness and fundamental 
methodological uncertainties about reverse inference from brain activity to cons-
ciousness (Klein 2010; Owen 2013), were not at the forefront of the uncertainties of 
the research informants in this project.
The Clinical Perspective 
Scientific Uncertainty in the Clinic
As mentioned previously, the fMRI researchers were able to detect a response in a 
patient otherwise believed to be in a vegetative state, despite poor image quality. 
When learning about the response the physician was surprised, as this was not 
the expected outcome for the patient who in all behavioral tests in the clinic had 
presented to be vegetative (see also opening vignette of the paper). Yet, confronted 
with this finding the physician interpreted this in concordance with a previous 
observation of eye movement in the patient, seemingly responding to the noise 
of a stirring of a teaspoon in a coffee cup. In the end, however, the prognosis of 
the patient was not changed, as the physician decided to leave the information 
out of the prognosis and inform the relatives that the test was inconclusive. The 
physician considered the data material that served as the basis for the result as 
too uncertain due to the methodological uncertainty caused by the movements of 
the patient mentioned earlier. Thus, while the fMRI researchers, in the end, were 
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certain of their findings, the initial methodological uncertainty was considered by 
the physician as a reason for not integrating the result.
 At the same time, the fMRI result was interpreted as conflicting with the know-
ledge otherwise gained in the clinic. This highlights an experience of scientific 
uncertainty especially salient for the clinicians due to the complexity of progno-
stics. In order to develop a prognosis, the fMRI measurements are to be inte-
grated with results from other prognostic tools. An uncertainty arising from this 
complexity is how one should weigh evidence acquired through neuroscientific 
methods against other kinds of evidence when dealing with questions about the 
mind (Andersen 2017). An uncertainty is how to rate a detected brain response 
to the stimuli in the fMRI paradigms to responses to the stimuli observed in the 
course of recording a behavioral test (CRS-R). In the particular case of the pre-
viously mentioned scan of an OCHA-patient, the methodological uncertainty due 
to ambiguity explains the apparent lack of influence of the fMRI result on the 
prognosis. However, the observation makes one question come to the forefront: 
whether the result, had it been more certain, would have made any difference for 
the prognosis of the individual patient after all? How does a response to music, 
detectable only in the fMRI scanner, rate in comparison to a response detectable 
by behavior? The CRS-R relies on multimodal stimuli and in this sense, the audi-
tory stimuli of the fMRI only cover a narrow part of the spectrum. Should these 
tests count as equal? In the philosophical literature, this issue has been approac-
hed in different ways. Bayne, Hohwy and Owen (2017) have argued that the recent 
results of neuroimaging highlight taxonomical uncertainties about the adequacy 
of the current diagnostic categories. They suggest to reform the taxonomy based 
on additional brain-based criteria.  In contrast, Fisher and Truog (2017) argue that 
the uncertainties in diagnostics distinguishing between VS and MCS by detecting 
consciousness are so severe that the taxonomical distinction is not tenable. On this 
ground, they advocate for deemphasizing the role of consciousness in decisions 
surrounding unresponsive patients. Instead, they suggest to make decisions in 
collaboration with the relatives based on presumed values of the patient. Howe-
ver, as we shall see in the following, the values of the patient are themselves the 
source of considerable uncertainty.
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Personal Uncertainty Due to Ambiguity 
Based on our work, the framing of personal uncertainty by Han et al. (2011 and 
2017) is too narrowly focused on the patient. The clinicians also experience uncer-
tainty about issues relating to existential questions concerning the experienced 
value of life of a patient and the potential influence on the patient’s social relati-
ons. Thus, the issue of personal uncertainty is not exclusively experienced by the 
patient as is indirectly suggested by Han et al. (2011 and 2017). The uncertainty is 
enhanced in situations where patients are unable to express preferences or parti-
cipate in medical decisions (Kaufman 2003). It has come up in conversations with 
clinicians during this study how they worry about the kind of life they are able to 
preserve for the patient, and how this life may be experienced differently by dif-
ferent patients. Despite suffering similar damage, patients may have existentially 
very different experiences. The clinicians have experienced this difference in re-
covered patients. Some patients experience a renewed appreciation of life while 
others may not be able to cope with the new conditions and may form a wish to 
take their own life. In this way, the clinicians, despite having done their very best 
in terms of medical efforts, cannot be certain that this provides a life and an expe-
rience of life worth in accordance with the values of the patient. 
Would the development of neuroscientific methods be able to alleviate this kind 
of uncertainty?  By employing active paradigms (where people have to react to the 
stimuli by imagining things like playing tennis (Owen et al. 2006)) some resear-
chers believe that we may be able to communicate with some of the unresponsive 
patients. A meta-analysis of the research shows that about 15% of patients beli-
eved to be in a vegetative state are able to follow orders when asked to imagine 
certain scenarios (Kondziella et al. 2016). This has been suggested as a method for 
assessing the quality of life of patients with DOC (Tung et al. 2019). However, this 
kind of assessment would require a substantial amount of time in the scanner and 
would not be feasible in the clinic within the near future. Given that people attach 
different values to their experiences, it must be based on the values of each indi-
vidual. Thus, general estimates will not be sufficient. Further, it still leaves a large 
group of patients who are unable to actively react to stimuli but may nevertheless 
be able to have conscious experiences (Kondziella et al. 2016). Therefore, the hope 
of eliminating this kind of uncertainty entirely is limited.
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Discussion 
Evidently, the above outline represents only a subset of instances of uncertainty 
related to diagnostics, prognostics, treatment and care connected to this group 
of patients. In the forming of a prognosis, uncertainty is always involved when 
transferring knowledge about frequencies in populations into a prognosis for the 
individual. This uncertainty stems from probabilities and will persist regardless 
of the prognostic tools one employs. Also, behavioral as well as neuroscientific 
tests only reveal the degree of consciousness at the specific moment of testing, and 
consciousness in these patients is known to fluctuate (Zeman 2002). Therefore, the 
presence of consciousness cannot be ruled out entirely and the diagnosis of VS is 
given only on the basis of finding no evidence of consciousness (Coleman et al. 
2007). 
What is gained by using the three-dimensional model developed by Han, Klein 
and Arora (2011) is that the separate aspects of the uncertainties become visible. 
For example, by paying attention to the locus we may recognize that uncertainties 
having the same issue and source will lead to different actions of management de-
pending on whether one has primarily clinical or research responsibilities. It also 
becomes visible how the context of loci and issue shapes the source. Ambiguity is 
the source of both the methodological uncertainty experienced by the researchers 
and the personal uncertainty experienced by the clinicians, however, the distinct 
features, as well as the possibilities of working towards a reduction of such uncer-
tainty, is different in the two instances. We may also observe that while the new 
technology may remedy some of the methodological and conceptual uncertainties 
of the behavioral test (CRS-R), such as not equating behavior and consciousness 
and (potentially) leading to less misdiagnosis, it does introduce new methodolo-
gical and conceptual uncertainties.
A conceptual limitation of the three-dimensional framework is the insistence 
on the subjective nature of uncertainty. Han, Klein and Arora (2011) take it as their 
point of departure that uncertainty is »the subjective perception of ignorance« (p. 830) 
and a »state of mind rather than a feature of the objective world« (p. 829). However, 
they provide no reason for assuming that this definition is correct. It seems that 
this definition could conflict with their understanding of uncertainty arising from 
probability (aleatory), which is assumed to be intrinsic to the phenomenon and 
thereby a feature of the objective world. A philosophical discussion of the subjec-
tive nature of the three-dimensional framework is outside the scope of this article, 
however, we wish to highlight that this assumption constitutes a conceptual li-
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mitation of the framework. Recognizing non-subjective variants of uncertainties 
would lead the way for recognizing other possible loci as carriers of uncertainties, 
such as for example documents (i.e. patient records and research protocols). 
One of the advances of the three-dimensional framework, according to Han, 
Klein and Arora (2011), is that it seeks to encompass all manifestations of uncer-
tainty in health care, whereas others, e.g. Mishel (1981) or Kasper et al. (2008), fo-
cus exclusively on uncertainty experienced by patients. However, utility does not 
in itself come with the possibility of capturing the full range. Utility depends on 
purpose. Compare it to the case where you have a map of a city. This map details 
roads etc. and is practical for locating an address. However, it is of no use if you 
want to find the highest point in the city or see where the city is located relative 
to other cities in the country. In contrast, a full map of the country provides a 
good overview but is useless when it comes to locating an address. Capturing 
the full range comes with a price, namely the price of abstraction. One challenge 
that we experienced in our work was that categorizing the individual instances 
of uncertainty by using the theoretical framework of the dimensions directed our 
attention to the particular instances of uncertainty as separate from the situation. 
This focus creates a tendency to neglect the influence of the environment of the 
situation and how different uncertainties may influence each other just by being 
part of the same situation and not by conceptual relations or logical implications. 
Our considerations have been to create an iterative process moving back and 
forth and creating a dialogue (Mansnerus and Wagenknecht 2015) between the ca-
tegories outlined by the theoretical framework, conceptual possibilities of uncer-
tainties and the salience of uncertainties in the empirical setting. The advantage 
of this combined approach is that abstraction allows for discovering uncertainties 
less visible in the empirical setting (an empirical exploration which is also con-
strained by the access one is granted as a researcher). At the same time, close 
attention to the empirical setting revealed uncertainties that would perhaps go 
unnoticed in a purely theoretical approach. This was the case when we looked 
into the issue of how the stimuli and paradigm were changed for the fMRI study. 
At first, it seemed that employing a new and not previously tested paradigm and 
stimuli were incompatible with standards of good research practice. However, 
through our observations and interviews a second time, we became aware that 
this too was an attempt of managing uncertainties; uncertainties that arose in the 
clinical setting and in the circumstances of this particular kind of patients. 
The approach of analytic philosophy of science is to work with conceptual di-
stinctions to form a theory of uncertainty that will be able to model all types of 
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uncertainty at all times. It explores the possible logical spaces for abstract types of 
uncertainty rather than focusing on which uncertainties are in fact implemented. 
A scientifically informed analytic philosophy of science will, of course, seek to 
find examples of uncertainties. However, it is also assumed that knowledge about 
types of uncertainties, which may never occur, will enlighten us in our knowledge 
about the ones that do in fact occur. In contrast, in anthropology the goal is rarely 
a complete theory or model but rather, through descriptions of the emergent ob-
ject in the situated practice of fieldwork, producing different ways of knowledge-
making that analytically transcend the obvious. That is, analytic philosophy gene-
rally works by abstracting away from the specificities of the situation. In contrast, 
the object of study in anthropology is always specifically situated. In this article, 
we have sought to apply both approaches.  
Conclusion
In this article, we have employed and critically discussed a three-dimensional 
taxonomy of uncertainty combined with empirical material to trace key uncer-
tainties in the development of new prognostic tools for OHCA patients with am-
biguous consciousness, as well as showed how these uncertainties relate to the 
uncertainties identified in the clinical settings. We argued that strictly speaking 
on Han, Klein and Arora (2011)’s framework, uncertainties cannot really be sha-
red. Rather, what may be shared is the source and issue. In our analysis, we iden-
tified the salient uncertainties from the perspective of the researchers as that of 
methodological uncertainties and showed how these lead to different uncertain-
ties experienced by the clinicians. At the same time, we showed how ambiguity 
may be the source of both personal and scientific uncertainty. However, the con-
text of issues and loci determines the nature of the source significantly. We further 
argued that Han, Klein and Arora (2011)’s framework must be extended to include 
personal uncertainties experienced by clinicians in relation to the patients and 
that these are especially salient when patients are unresponsive.
As our knowledge builds and transforms, so will the uncertainties tied to it. 
It is not possible to predict the uncertainties of the future, however, providing a 
language for categorization may be of practical use to clinicians and researchers to 
support their practice and enable discussions of management of uncertainties re-
lated to the novel nature of these technologies. A central part of managing uncer-
tainties is being able to identify uncertainties and their characteristics, as well as 
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being aware of which kinds of uncertainties, in both research and clinical practi-
ces surrounding these severely injured patients, are to be accepted and which are 
to be sought reduced in the future. Our focus has been the researchers and clini-
cians involved in research. However, this knowledge of uncertainties may also in 
the future prove helpful in selecting strategies for communication with surrogates 
of unresponsive OHCA-patients. 
Figure 1: 
Figure 1: Dimensions of Uncertainty
The figure depicts the dimensions of uncertainty in the Han, Klein and Arora 
(2011) framework. Note that each individual experience of uncertainty will always 
be a mix of all three major dimensions. The figure does not include methodological 
and conceptual uncertainty. Both these subspecies of uncertainty have ambiguity 
as their source and are tied to the issue of scientific uncertainty. These subcate-
gories thus cut across the framework and would need to be depicted separately. 
(Han et al. 2017 developed a similar figure of their findings in the area of genetics. 
However, as they include such mixed subcategories the figure is imprecise)
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Notes
1. We use the term ‘vegetative state’ as this is the term used by our informants. However, 
increasingly the term unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS) is adopted in its 
place in order to avoid the negative connotations of the word ‘vegetative’ as well as a 
way to recognize the uncertainties regarding the degree of consciousness (Laureys et 
al. 2010; Machado et al. 2012).
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